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WHITE COLLAR CRIME 
Robert J. Anello* & Miriam L. Glaser** 
INTRODUCTION 
A mention of New York City, the seat of the Second Circuit, invariably 
evokes thoughts of finance.  The home of Wall Street and the World Trade 
Center, Manhattan is also home to many of the country’s major banks, 
hedge funds, and stock exchanges; the Securities & Exchange Commission 
has a branch office in New York, as do the Federal Reserve Bank, the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and the Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice.  Even the Court of International Trade is located in 
Manhattan.  Unsurprisingly then, New York City has also played host to 
some of the most important white collar criminal prosecutions in the nation.  
As the federal appellate court with jurisdiction over this financial center, the 
Second Circuit has ruled on many critical issues related to white collar 
crime.  Distinctive in its understanding of business practice, its readiness to 
identify and oppose legislative encroachment into the realm of the judiciary, 
and in the high value it places upon legal history and stare decisis, the 
Second Circuit’s sophisticated jurisprudence has influenced courts 
nationwide. 
This Article will address six different areas of white collar law and 
procedure:  (1) fraud, (2) the Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Organizations 
Act (RICO), (3) conspiracy, (4) public corruption, (5) white collar practice, 
and (6) sentencing.  Many of the cases profiled in this Article have driven 
legal and cultural developments far beyond the federal courts, including the 
cases of Leona Helmsley, one of New York’s most prominent real estate 
moguls; the “Mafia Commission,” a take-down of the bosses of the Five 
Families of La Cosa Nostra; and Abscam, a massive sting operation created 
by the federal government to expose corrupt officials.  Of course, the cases 
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and doctrines discussed can only scratch the surface of the vast wealth of 
jurisprudence and leadership that the Second Circuit has provided in the 
arena of white collar crime.  Even more fascinating material therefore 
awaits the interested and industrious reader in his or her own research. 
I.  FRAUD 
Any survey of white collar criminal jurisprudence must start with the 
jurisprudence and statutory evolution of fraud.  Although today fraud is 
viewed as part of the heartland of white collar crime, until relatively 
recently fraud was rarely deemed a crime at all.  Although a federal 
criminal fraud statute had existed in some form since this nation’s founding, 
it was rarely used.  Its use was particularly uncommon against “private 
fraud”—fraud between two private parties—rather than fraud against the 
public at large.1  Such fraud generally was seen, at worst, as the basis for a 
civil suit by the defrauded party. 
In the early twentieth century, amid a general expansion of federal 
criminal law, prosecutors realized the powerful nature of criminal fraud.  
Accordingly, the Second Circuit, as the appellate court at America’s 
financial heart, began to more frequently encounter and rule on the meaning 
and reach of the federal fraud statutes.  As the courts’ and the government’s 
understanding of criminal fraud evolved, the Second Circuit reviewed many 
of the most significant fraud prosecutions.  Today, the Second Circuit is 
perceived as one of the nation’s leaders in its jurisprudential and statutory 
development of the crime of fraud. 
A.  The Development of Fraud Doctrines 
Ninety years ago, in Bentel v. United States,2 the Second Circuit 
reviewed an early modern-era criminal securities fraud conviction in which 
the defendant was convicted of defrauding others into purchasing shares in 
a nonexistent company.  The court observed that a “stock swindle” was 
what would have been considered at common law to be a private fraud and 
engaged in an extensive historical analysis of the evolution of fraud 
enforcement from a theory of “caveat emptor,” in which the victim of fraud 
generally was considered to be at fault and could recover at most money 
damages, to a crime that risked criminal punishment.3  The court recited 
certain elements of civil private fraud—including the statement of a 
falsehood with a guilty knowledge (known as “scienter”) of its falsity—and 
held that those elements apply with equal force when “a civil responsibility 
becomes by statute a criminal offense.”4 
Today, criminal fraud jurisprudence has grown sophisticated and 
multifaceted.  Broadly worded statutes render individuals and corporations 
subject to federal criminal liability for nearly any type of fraud, so long as 
 
 1. See Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Fraud, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 729, 736–37 (1999). 
 2. 13 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1926). 
 3. See id. at 329. 
 4. Id. 
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some instrumentality of interstate commerce is employed in the course of 
the crime.  Such fraud need not be overtly “public”—even those cases that 
do not involve fraud on the public at large are considered serious enough to 
merit federal enforcement.  There also have been a variety of developments 
in enforcement:  several highly specialized criminal fraud statutes now 
exist, specifically targeting conduct affecting financial institutions,5 the 
government,6 the securities industry,7 and more.  Other fraud statutes, 
including the general mail and wire fraud statutes, which are the focus of 
this subchapter, broadly penalize schemes “to defraud” or to “obtain[] 
money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, or promises.”8 
With the growth of fraud enforcement, one of the most critical recurring 
issues has been the nature of “property.”  The Second Circuit has analyzed 
extensively whether particular types of property or other rights, whether 
tangible or intangible, can be the subject of criminal fraud charges.  In 
United States v. Schwartz,9 the defendant and others were prosecuted for an 
elaborate scheme to sell American arms and munitions to individuals in 
countries such as Poland, Argentina, Iraq, Mexico, and the Soviet Union.  
Among other charges, prosecutors alleged that the defendant had violated 
the wire fraud statute by fraudulently obtaining an export license.10 
On appeal, the Second Circuit was presented with the question of 
whether an export license issued by the federal government can constitute 
“property” in the hands of the government, as that term was construed by 
the Supreme Court in McNally v. United States.11  The Second Circuit 
joined several other courts of appeals in determining that an unissued 
license, such as the one at issue in Schwartz, was not property within the 
meaning of the federal fraud statutes, and therefore the obtaining of such a 
license by fraud does not rise to the level of mail or wire fraud.12  The court 
accordingly overturned the conviction under the wire fraud statute.13 
That same year, the Second Circuit decided United States v. Helmsley,14 
which upheld the conviction of prominent New York City landowner Leona 
Helmsley on charges of mail fraud arising out of a tax evasion scheme.  
Both loved and reviled by the media that dubbed her “Queen of Mean,” 
Helmsley had once famously declared to a housemaid that “only the little 
 
 5. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012). 
 6. See, e.g., id. § 371 (conspiracy to defraud the government); id. § 1347 (health care 
fraud). 
 7. Id. § 1348.  These types of fraud are discussed in Karen Patton Seymour, Securities 
and Financial Regulation in the Second Circuit, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 225 (2016). 
 8. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343. 
 9. 924 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 10. See id. at 413. 
 11. 483 U.S. 350, 350 (1987). 
 12. See Schwartz, 924 F.2d at 416–18. 
 13. The Second Circuit’s view of the law was borne out nine years later by the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000), which held that an unissued 
license did not qualify as property within the meaning of the mail fraud statute. 
 14. 941 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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people pay taxes.”15  Upon her conviction for defrauding the State of New 
York out of $1.7 million in taxes, Helmsley argued to the court that her 
conviction should be overturned because the government had not proved 
that she, in fact, owed any money to the state.16  Observing that the mail 
fraud statute “punishes the scheme, not its success,”17 the court rejected 
Helmsley’s argument and held that a scheme to deprive the state of income 
taxes was cognizable under the mail fraud statute, even if the state was not, 
in fact, deprived of property because no taxes were actually owed.18 
More recently, the Second Circuit addressed a similar issue in Fountain 
v. United States.19  Fountain, a retired Northern New York-area police 
officer turned illegal cigarette importer, was arrested for evading both 
United States and Canadian taxes and charged with conspiracy to launder 
the proceeds of a wire fraud scheme.20  Specifically, the government argued 
that the taxes he failed to pay on the cigarettes constituted property owed to 
the government and that Fountain had illegally deprived the government of 
that property.21 
On appeal, Fountain argued that the Supreme Court in Cleveland v. 
United States22 had determined that an unissued license did not constitute 
property subject to the federal fraud statutes and that unpaid taxes should be 
treated in a similar manner.23  In addressing Fountain’s argument, the court 
reviewed extensively its own body of case law, as well as that of other 
courts of appeals, with regard to tangible and intangible property.24  Citing, 
among other cases, the Helmsley opinion, the court held that, although taxes 
owed to the government are “intangible” and have not yet been collected, 
they are nevertheless “property” for the purpose of the mail and wire fraud 
statutes.25  The court thereby affirmed the ongoing viability of the mail and 
wire fraud statutes as tools by which the government may prosecute tax 
crimes. 
 
 15. Sewell Chan, Remembering Leona Helmsley, N.Y. TIMES:  CITY ROOM (Aug. 20, 
2007, 4:25 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/08/20/leona-helmsley-is-dead-at-
87/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/U2HB-S9CS]. 
 16. The government’s proof had focused on Helmsley’s tax debt to the federal 
government, but the government relied on Helmsley’s New York State tax returns as proof 
that her tax evasion had also been directed at the state. See Helmsley, 941 F.2d at 93. 
 17. Id. at 94 (emphasis added). 
 18. See id. at 94–95. 
 19. 357 F.3d 250 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 20. See id. at 252–54. 
 21. See id. at 252. 
 22. 531 U.S. 12 (2000). 
 23. Fountain, 357 F.3d at 255. 
 24. The posture of the Fountain case on appeal was unusual:  because Fountain had 
pleaded guilty, he had not appealed his conviction but brought this case as a petition for 
habeas corpus arising out of an intervening change in the law. See id. at 252–54.  The 
Second Circuit therefore evaluated his claim under the rarely used actual innocence standard. 
See id. at 254–55. 
 25. Id. at 257–60. 
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B.  Honest Services Fraud 
As the scope of fraud liability has expanded in the modern era, the mail 
and wire fraud statutes have become a key tool for the government.  
Violations of those statutes are charged in a significant number of white 
collar prosecutions, often serving as a “catch-all” charge where no other 
federal statute seems to fit, or as a back-up charge to ensure that the 
defendant is convicted of at least some form of criminal offense. 
Courts have interpreted the mail and wire fraud statutes26 to penalize 
frauds that deprived the government, a company, or even the electorate (in 
the case of a public official) of “intangible” property:  specifically, a right 
or entitlement.  Although, as discussed above, the entire concept of 
“intangible” property has been subject to heavy scrutiny by the courts, 
perhaps the most hotly contested form of intangible property is the right to 
the “honest services,” or loyalty, of an employee or public official.27  The 
issue of whether the deprivation of such “honest services” can constitute 
mail or wire fraud has been the subject of appellate court rulings, Supreme 
Court decisions, and congressional action. 
The most prominent, and arguably the most influential, action by the 
federal courts on the issue of honest services was the case of McNally v. 
United States.28  In McNally, the Supreme Court addressed decades of 
jurisprudence and “judge-made law”29 when it decided whether the mail 
and wire fraud statutes penalized “schemes to defraud citizens of their 
intangible rights to honest and impartial government.”30  In a major reversal 
against the government, the Court held that the “intangible right” to honest 
services was too “ambiguous” to give rise to criminal fraud liability.31 
McNally, however, was not the last word on the subject.  Just months 
before the Supreme Court issued its McNally decision, the Second Circuit 
decided United States v. Carpenter,32 which addressed the conviction of 
Wall Street Journal reporter R. Foster Winans for leaking the contents of 
his upcoming “Heard on the Street” rumors columns.33  Winans’s 
conviction for insider trading and mail and wire fraud sent tremors 
throughout Wall Street, as it demonstrated that the spread of mere rumors 
could give rise to criminal liability.  In addition to its immediate effect on 
Wall Street, however, Carpenter had a longer-term effect on the 
 
 26. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2012). 
 27. See, e.g., United States v. Brasco, 516 F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1975) (per curiam); United 
States v. Del Toro, 513 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 28. 483 U.S. 350 (1987). 
 29. As the Second Circuit explained in United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 
2002), “[t]he doctrine of ‘honest services’ was originally judge-made law.” Id. at 101. 
 30. McNally, 483 U.S. at 355. 
 31. Id. at 360. 
 32. 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 33. In Carpenter, the Second Circuit upheld a mail and wire fraud conviction premised 
upon a Wall Street Journal columnist’s misappropriation of intangible “property” consisting 
of “material nonpublic information in the form of the [Wall Street Journal’s] forthcoming 
publication schedule.” Id. at 1026.  The substantive issues addressed in the Carpenter 
decision are discussed in Seymour, supra note 7, at 249. 
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development of “intangible rights” jurisprudence:  granting certiorari from 
the Second Circuit’s opinion, the Supreme Court used Carpenter to clarify 
that, although the intangible right of honest services was too ambiguous to 
give rise to fraud liability, “McNally did not limit the scope of [mail fraud] 
to tangible as distinguished from intangible property rights,” as a more 
general matter.34  Therefore, the Wall Street Journal’s intangible right to 
privacy in its own confidential information was still the type of intangible 
property that could support a conviction for mail or wire fraud.35 
A year after the Supreme Court’s decisions in McNally and Carpenter, 
Congress responded by codifying the honest services doctrine in a separate 
provision of the United States Code.  In 18 U.S.C. § 1346, Congress 
declared that “[f]or the purposes of [mail and wire fraud], the term ‘scheme 
or artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the 
intangible right of honest services.”36  Congress did not define the term 
“honest services,” however, which left the responsibility to the courts to 
clarify the statute’s scope.37 
Nearly fifteen years after Congress enacted § 1346, the Second Circuit 
was asked again to determine the scope of criminal liability under a theory 
of honest services fraud.  The court addressed the issue in United States v. 
Handakas,38 a case involving the conviction of a contractor who, in the 
course of providing services to the New York School Construction 
Authority (SCA), underpaid his employees and embezzled the extra money 
for himself.39  Handakas was convicted of mail fraud for his failure to 
render honest services to the SCA, because his conduct deprived the SCA 
of the “right to determine how its contracts would be fulfilled.”40 
On appeal, the Second Circuit extensively surveyed the state of the law 
with regard to honest services fraud,41 and considered whether the statute 
provided sufficient notice to Handakas that his conduct was prohibited.42  
The court determined that the statute had not done so and that § 1346 was 
void for vagueness as applied to the facts of the case.43  By reversing 
Handakas’s conviction for mail fraud,44 the divided panel of the Second 
Circuit continued the long-running feud between the federal courts and 
 
 34. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 (1987). 
 35. Id. 
 36. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012). 
 37. See United States v. Milovanovic, 678 F.3d 713, 720–21 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that 
the scope of § 1346 remained uncertain, leading to questions as to whether the statute was 
unconstitutionally vague and citing the Second Circuit’s answer to that question in United 
States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 144 (2d Cir. 2003) (en banc)). 
 38. 286 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 39. See id. at 96–97. 
 40. Id. at 100. 
 41. Id. at 103. 
 42. See id. at 101. 
 43. The court indicated that, had it been writing on a clean slate, it would have wholly 
overturned § 1346 as void for vagueness; however, because the statute had been upheld in an 
earlier opinion of the Second Circuit, United States v. Sancho, 157 F.3d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 
1998) (per curiam), the court was constrained to invalidate the statute solely on the facts 
presented by Handakas’s case. See Handakas, 286 F.3d at 105–06. 
 44. Handakas, 286 F.3d at 112. 
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Congress, and raised fresh doubts about the viability of the honest services 
fraud theory. 
Just one year later, however, Handakas was overruled by the Second 
Circuit sitting en banc in United States v. Rybicki.45  In Rybicki, personal 
injury attorneys Thomas Rybicki and Fredric Grae conspired to bribe 
insurance claim adjusters for favorable outcomes for their clients.46  Not 
only did the adjusters accept the payments in defiance of their employers’ 
prohibition against such payments, but the adjusters also (unsurprisingly) 
failed to notify their employers that they had been offered bribes.47  Rybicki 
and Grae were thereafter convicted of defrauding client insurance 
companies out of, among other things, the honest services of their claims 
adjusters.48 
On appeal, Rybicki and Grae argued to the Second Circuit that the honest 
services fraud statute, § 1346, was void for vagueness and thereby 
unconstitutional.49  After losing their appeal,50 Rybicki and Grae requested 
and received a rehearing by the full Second Circuit, sitting en banc.  The en 
banc court upheld the fraud convictions, holding that § 1346 was intended 
to be broad and its breadth did not render the statute void for vagueness.51 
Other appellate courts disagreed with the Second Circuit’s interpretation 
of § 1346,52 which resulted in a circuit split that the Supreme Court 
resolved in its 2010 decision in Skilling v. United States.53  Skilling, which 
limited the applicability of honest services fraud to instances of bribery and 
kickbacks,54 has now settled the issue of the breadth of § 1346—at least 
temporarily.  In truth, however, the tortured history of honest services fraud 
suggests that its story is by no means over.  And, given that same history, it 
seems likely that a significant part of that next chapter will likewise be 
written by the Second Circuit. 
 
 45. 354 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
 46. See id. at 127. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. at 128. 
 49. United States v. Rybicki, 287 F.3d 257, 263 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 50. See id. at 266–67. 
 51. Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 144. 
 52. See, e.g., United States v. McGeehan, 584 F.3d 560, 571 n.10 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(discussing and analyzing circuit split between the Second Circuit and, among others, the 
Sixth Circuit); United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 519–20 (5th Cir. 2006) (following 
Rybicki). 
 53. 561 U.S. 358 (2010).  Skilling addressed the appeal of a twenty-five-year sentence 
imposed on a former Enron executive for his role in that company’s collapse. See id. at 368–
77.  Skilling had been convicted of defrauding Enron out of his honest services as a result of 
his alleged financial mismanagement and insider trading. See id. at 375.  The Supreme Court 
determined, among other things, that self-dealing by an executive did not deprive his 
company of his honest services in a manner cognizable by the mail and wire fraud statutes. 
See id. at 413. 
 54. Id. at 409. 
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II.  RICO AND ORGANIZED CRIME 
As the nation’s capital of business and industry, as well as a significant 
maritime port of entry, New York historically has been the site of 
significant organized crime and racketeering activity.  The Second Circuit 
has therefore earned a prominent place in the interpretation of the various 
federal statutes put in place to address such crimes.  One such statute is 
RICO,55 which sets forth harsh penalties for criminal actions committed 
using an enterprise.56  RICO also functions to extend the statute of 
limitations on so-called “racketeering” crimes, allowing governmental 
action to sweep up criminal activity such as bribes, money laundering, and 
other conduct that occurred well outside of the otherwise-applicable statute 
of limitations, so long as a single act of racketeering occurred within the 
limitations period.57  The culmination of President Nixon’s major organized 
crime control initiative in the late 1960s, RICO originally was enacted with 
the intent to reach the organized crime that was so prevalent in major cities 
such as New York and Chicago.58  However, the statute is such a powerful 
tool that it has been used (often quite controversially) to reach organized 
criminal activity—including gangs and corrupt unions—as well as business 
activities that some argue are far beyond the statute’s purview.59 
A.  Mafia Prosecutions 
The first major Mafia prosecution in New York, United States v. 
Salerno,60 (“the Mafia Commission case”) came before the Second Circuit 
at a time when organized crime was rampant in New York and mobsters 
went about their business with seeming impunity.  The Mafia was 
romanticized by movies such as The Godfather,61 and prosecutors seemed 
largely unable—or at times unwilling—to take on the difficult work of 
eradicating New York’s organized crime families.  The Mafia’s impact was 
felt not only in the realm of illegal drug importation (particularly heroin and 
cocaine), but also in the realm of legitimate business, where La Cosa 
Nostra’s loan sharking and protection rackets were ubiquitous.62 
Salerno was the first of several blows that many hoped would begin the 
process of dismantling New York’s Mafia.  The case involved the 
successful prosecution of the bosses of all five of New York’s La Cosa 
Nostra families on several charges, including extortion, cocaine 
 
 55. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 
(2012). 
 56. RICO defines an enterprise as “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, 
or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a 
legal entity” through which a pattern of racketeering is conducted. Id. § 1961. 
 57. See G. Robert Blakey, Time-Bars:  RICO—Criminal and Civil—Federal and State, 
88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1581, 1643–50 (2013). 
 58. See id. at 1594–95. 
 59. See infra Part II.B. 
 60. 794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 61. THE GODFATHER (Paramount Pictures 1972). 
 62. See Blakey, supra note 57, at 1594–95. 
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importation, loan sharking, and murder,63 and was described by then-U.S. 
Attorney Rudolph Giuliani as a building block in his effort to “wipe out the 
five families.”64  Evidence at the Salerno trial showed just how organized 
the Mafia could be:  the “Mafia Commission,” from which the case took its 
nickname, was the appellation given to a semi-official group of leaders 
from each of the Five Families of La Cosa Nostra—leaders who were the 
defendants in the Mafia Commission case—which some likened to a “board 
of directors” or a “ruling council” for the mob.65 
Appeals from the convictions in Salerno presented several knotty issues 
to the Second Circuit, including arguments that the convictions suffered 
from various infirmities such as a lack of evidence and that they were 
barred by the statute of limitations.  The case also generated an appeal to 
the Supreme Court on the issue of Salerno’s pretrial detention.66 
Perhaps the most prominent RICO decision in white collar jurisprudence 
was the Second Circuit’s en banc opinion in the related case of United 
States v. Indelicato,67 which addressed the definition of the key RICO term 
“pattern of racketeering activity.”68  Indelicato, a “soldier”69 in the 
Bonanno family, argued that his murder of several members of rival 
families in a single “hit” could not be considered a “pattern of racketeering 
activity,” as the murders were all part of one “criminal transaction.”70  
Sitting en banc, the court reviewed extensively its own and other courts of 
appeals’ jurisprudence on the definition of the term “pattern,” observing 
that the decision in United States v. Ianniello,71 which held that two 
unrelated criminal acts could form a “pattern,” was an outlier among the 
courts of appeals.72  The court accordingly overruled its prior Ianniello 
decision and held that two related criminal acts could together constitute a 
“pattern” within the meaning of the RICO statute.73  However, its decision 
also further deepened a separate circuit split by holding that such offenses 
could still be deemed two distinct acts even if committed virtually 
simultaneously.74  In so doing, the court promulgated what has become 
 
 63. Salerno, 794 F.2d at 66–67. 
 64. Richard Stengel, The Passionate Prosecutor, TIME (June 24, 2001), 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,143096,00.html [https://perma.cc/6DR 
J-UMDS]. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).  Although the Salerno bail 
opinion is beyond the purview of this article, we note simply that the appeal was 
unsuccessful for Salerno. 
 67. 865 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 68. Id. at 1371. 
 69. A soldier is a lower-level member of a Mafia family. 
 70. Indelicato, 865 F.2d at 1372. 
 71. 808 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 72. See Indelicato, 865 F.2d at 1382. 
 73. See id. at 1381–84.  Five months after Indelicato, the Supreme Court agreed with the 
Second Circuit, and in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 235 
(1989), it overruled the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of a RICO pattern to require proof of 
multiple schemes. 
 74. See Indelicato, 865 F.2d at 1383. 
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known as the “relatedness and continuity” test for distinguishing RICO 
crimes, which has been adopted by several other courts of appeals.75 
After years of appeals such as the ones described above, the Mafia 
Commission convictions were in large part upheld, and the Mafia 
Commission itself effectively decapitated.76  These convictions, and the 
Second Circuit’s affirmance thereof, constituted the first significant blow to 
La Cosa Nostra in New York. 
The Mafia Commission case was followed in short order by the arrest and 
trial of Filippo Casamento and several dozen other Mafia figures, which 
came to be known as the “Pizza Connection” case as a result of the 
mobsters’ use of various New York City pizza parlors as a front for their 
illegal operations.77  The defendants were accused of shipping over $1.5 
billion in heroin to the United States from Mafia connections in Sicily.78  
After an extraordinary seventeen-month trial that saw several defendants 
testify in their own defense (with apparently deleterious effects79), cost the 
government millions of dollars to conduct, and remains the longest criminal 
trial ever conducted in the Southern District of New York,80 the defendants 
were convicted of crimes, including murder, money laundering, and 
extortion.81  The Pizza Connection case thereby served as the second 
significant blow to the New York Mafia in as many years. 
The appeal from the Pizza Connection case came before the Second 
Circuit while some of the Mafia Commission appeals were still pending.  
Casamento and his codefendants asserted that errors regarding the 
introduction of evidence, pretrial publicity, and the nature of the RICO 
“enterprise” had infected their trial.82  Perhaps most notably, several more 
minor defendants also argued that evidence of the conduct of other 
defendants had prejudiced their defenses and that their cases should have 
been severed from the defendants who played larger roles in the offenses.83  
The court analyzed the minor defendants’ defense strategies and determined 
 
 75. See e.g., United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 565–66 (3d Cir. 1991) (following 
Indelicato); United States v. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362, 1366 (7th Cir. 1991) (same); United 
States v. Anguilo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1180 (1st Cir. 1990) (citing to Indelicato for the 
proposition that “[i]t is the relationship between the acts and the affairs of the enterprise that 
renders [defendant’s] conduct a pattern of racketeering activity under RICO”). 
 76. United States v. Salerno, 868 F.2d 524, 543 (2d Cir. 1989) (affirming conviction); 
see also Arnold H. Lubasch, U.S. Jury Convicts Eight as Members of Mob Commission, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 1986), http://www.nytimes.com/1986/11/20/nyregion/us-jury-
convicts-eight-as-members-of-mob-commission.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/SV3 
7-VPVH]. 
 77. See generally United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 78. See id. at 1148–49. 
 79. See id. at 1153. 
 80. See Frank J. Prial, U.S. Seeks Long Terms This Week for 16 in ‘Pizza Connection’ 
Case, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/06/21/nyregion/us-seeks-
long-terms-this-week-for-16-in-pizza-connection-case.html [https://perma.cc/849W-YNGT]; 
Jeffrey Toobin, Post-Pizza, NEW YORKER (Nov. 30, 2009), http://www.newyorker.com/ 
magazine/2009/11/30/post-pizza [https://perma.cc/DL65-BEFK]. 
 81. See Casamento, 887 F.2d at 1191–95. 
 82. Id. at 1149, 1154. 
 83. See id. at 1153. 
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that they were not inconsistent with those of the more prominent defendants 
and therefore held that the minor defendants had not suffered a cognizable 
prejudice from being tried alongside their Mafia superiors.84  Rejecting the 
defendants’ remaining contentions in a long, thoroughly reasoned opinion, 
the court substantially upheld the defendants’ convictions.85  The Pizza 
Connection case was later profiled in a report to Congress86 that became the 
primary impetus behind the legislature’s passage of the Money Laundering 
Control Act of 1986.87 
Less than a year after the resolution of the Casamento’s and Salerno’s 
appeals, John Gotti, the boss of the Gambino crime family, was arrested and 
charged with murder, conspiracy, and other RICO crimes.88  Gotti had 
acquired the moniker of “the Teflon Don” by managing, until that point, to 
avoid a significant criminal conviction.89  His successful tactics included 
inducing at least one mistrial through jury tampering.90  But this last arrest 
and six-week trial, highlighted by raucous, profanity-laden wiretaps, 
cooperator testimony from Salvatore “the Bull” Gravano, and the 
disqualification of Gotti’s attorney, Bruce Cutler, on the ground that he was 
“house counsel” to the Gambino family, led to Gotti’s conviction—by a 
sequestered and anonymous jury—and ultimately a life sentence.91  John 
Gotti died in prison in 2002.92 
The conviction of John Gotti was upheld by the Second Circuit in United 
States v. Locascio.93  Among other claims, Gotti argued that the district 
court had erred in disqualifying his counsel, that the joinder of several 
defendants’ cases into a single trial had caused prejudicial spillover against 
Gotti himself, and that there were various problems with evidentiary rulings 
made by the trial judge.94  In yet another lengthy and well-reasoned 
opinion, the Second Circuit upheld substantially all of Gotti’s convictions.95  
Among other significant issues addressed in the Gotti appeal, the court took 
the opportunity to strengthen its jurisprudence on joinder of multiple 
defendants into a single indictment, holding that so long as the trial judge 
was careful to instruct the jury with regard to how evidence was to be 
 
 84. See id. 
 85. See id. at 1191. 
 86. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, INTERIM REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 
AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE CASH CONNECTION:  ORGANIZED CRIME, FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS, AND MONEY LAUNDERING (Oct. 1984), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ 
Digitization/166517NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/QGP5-EFZY]. 
 87. See United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 539–40 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(discussing impact of Casamento on the development of money laundering law). 
 88. United States v. Gotti, 753 F. Supp. 443 (E.D.N.Y. 1990). 
 89. Selwyn Raab, John Gotti Is Dead at 61; Ex-Mafia Boss Courted Limelight,  
N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/10/national/10CND-
GOTTI.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/B643-3AVT]. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. 6 F.3d 924 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 94. See id. at 930–31. 
 95. See id. at 950–51. 
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considered, the trial of multiple defendants of varying levels of involvement 
and culpability was perfectly constitutional.96 
B.  Other Uses of the RICO Act 
Although the RICO Act was created to combat organized crime, its 
expansive nature has enabled prosecutors to use it against illegal activity in 
many other organizational contexts.  The Second Circuit has upheld use of 
the RICO Act in prosecutions of gangs,97 unions,98 kidnappers,99 and even 
in prosecutions of corruption within New York City agencies.100  Most 
relevantly for our purposes, RICO has been used extensively to combat 
business corruption.101  The sheer power of the RICO statute, coupled with 
businesses’ and businessmen’s natural reluctance to engage in protracted 
criminal litigation, means that fewer cases make it to the appellate stage.102  
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit has had the opportunity to lead in this area 
as well. 
One of the most prominent instances of a business prosecution using the 
RICO Act is the Wedtech scandal of the late 1980s.103  Wedtech, a South 
Bronx sheet metal fabricating firm that had recently become a publicly 
traded company, wished to enter into contracts with the government 
 
 96. See id. at 947. 
 97. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 1999) (prosecution of the Latin 
Kings gang). 
 98. See, e.g., United States v. Zichettello, 208 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2000) (prosecution of 
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v. Butler, 954 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1992) (prosecution of the president of Local 200, General 
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 99. See, e.g., United States v. Aulicino, 44 F.3d 1102 (2d Cir. 1995) (prosecution of a 
ring of drug dealers who regularly kidnapped and tortured other drug dealers). 
 100. See, e.g., United States v. Alkins, 925 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1991) (prosecution of 
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witness bribery); United States v. Porcelli, 865 F.2d 1352, 1355 (2d Cir. 1989) (RICO 
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stations); United States v. Teitler, 802 F.2d 606, 609 (2d Cir. 1986) (RICO prosecution of a 
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States v. Mazzei, 700 F.2d 85, 87 (2d Cir. 1983) (RICO prosecution involving a “point-
shaving scheme” at Boston College, which was the subject of an exposé in Sports 
Illustrated). 
 102. For example, one of the most famous RICO prosecutions of a legitimate-seeming 
business was that of Michael Milken and the brokerage firm where he worked, Drexel 
Burnham Lambert.  In 1989 Milken was indicted on ninety-eight counts of racketeering and 
fraud, and just over a year later he pleaded guilty.  Although the Milken fraud sent 
shockwaves through the business world, in the end the guilty plea meant that it was never 
appealed, and therefore the Second Circuit had no opportunity to pass on the legality of 
Milken’s conduct. See Drexel Burnham Lambert’s Legacy:  Stars of the Junkyard, 
ECONOMIST (Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/17306419 [https://perma.cc/ 
KP55-JER5]. 
 103. See United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1990). 
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pursuant to the Small Business Administration’s “[s]ection 8(a)” program, 
which permitted minority-owned businesses (such as Wedtech) to bid on 
government contracts outside of the normal competitive bidding process.104  
Then-Congressman Mario Biaggi was also a partner at a small firm, Biaggi 
& Ehrlich, which was retained in 1978 by Wedtech to engage in lobbying 
efforts on its behalf.105  Over the course of time, Wedtech paid substantial 
amounts of money to Biaggi & Ehrlich, including at least one $50,000 
payment that was later alleged to have been a bribe paid to induce Biaggi to 
use his influence on behalf of Wedtech.106  Biaggi indeed did exercise 
substantial influence on Wedtech’s behalf by, among other things, 
corresponding (through a contact) with then-White House Chief of Staff 
Edwin Meese and (allegedly) threatening at least one local government 
official with the withdrawal of Biaggi’s political support if the official did 
not vote in favor of a Wedtech project.107 
In 1987, Biaggi, his son Richard Biaggi, Ehrlich, Stanley Simon (the 
former Bronx Borough President), Peter Neglia (the former New York 
Regional Administrator for the Small Business Administration), and several 
Wedtech officers and employees were arrested and charged with various 
crimes, including bribery, extortion, tax evasion, perjury, and obstruction of 
justice; most of these offenses were also charged as racketeering acts for the 
purpose of the RICO Act.108  They were convicted at trial on the testimony 
of, among others, several cooperating witnesses who were former Wedtech 
employees.109  The defendants appealed their convictions to the Second 
Circuit. 
On appeal, the Second Circuit primarily focused on the sufficiency of the 
evidence with regard to the substantive offenses that formed the basis for 
the RICO convictions, rather than on issues specific to the RICO Act.  
However, the court took the opportunity to express its frustration with the 
government for its “frequent preference to charge a RICO violation 
whenever evidence indicates two eligible offenses.”110  Writing that “RICO 
was not enacted as an automatic sentence enhancement device,” the court 
made exquisitely clear its unwillingness to uphold a RICO conviction in 
which the “pattern” of illegality is purely the result of a charging decision 
by the government.111  To that end, the court cited Indelicato and reiterated 
that “the ‘pattern’ element guards against permitting RICO to be used 
against sporadic criminal activity.”112  Indeed, the court declared, “[i]f the 
commission of an offense and its false denial could establish a ‘pattern,’ 
 
 104. Id. at 670. 
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then every offense related to a criminal enterprise would be eligible for 
inclusion in a pattern whenever the offender falsely denied its commission.  
That is not what Congress intended.”113  Although the court upheld the vast 
majority of the defendants’ convictions, it reversed the individual RICO 
conviction that inspired the discussion above.114 
III.  CONSPIRACY 
The Second Circuit also has played a pivotal role in the development of a 
national jurisprudence regarding the two primary ways in which an 
individual may be held liable for the acts of others:  conspiracy115 and 
aiding-and-abetting liability.116  The Second Circuit has both expanded and 
sharpened the scope of these crimes, lending much-needed clarity to a 
tumultuous area of the law.  It also has inspired the Supreme Court to pen 
one of its most commonly cited opinions on the law of conspiracy:  
Kotteakos v. United States.117 
A.  The Role of Knowledge and Agreement 
in Conspiracy Liability 
In United States v. Peoni,118 the defendant, Joseph Peoni, was arrested 
and charged with passing counterfeit bills to a Mr. Regno.  In addition to 
his conviction on a charge of possessing counterfeit bills, Peoni was 
convicted of aiding, abetting, and conspiring with Regno in the further 
passing of the counterfeit bills to one Dorsey.119  In prosecuting Peoni for 
participating in Regno’s actions, the government argued that Peoni had to 
have known that those bills would then be passed to a third party, and that 
he was therefore liable for Regno’s passing of the bills.120  On appeal, 
Peoni argued that the mere knowledge that a crime may occur in the future 
as a result of one’s actions is not sufficient to give rise to accessory 
liability.121 
In a remarkable and scholarly opinion surveying American and English 
law as far back as the fourteenth century, the Second Circuit, speaking 
through Judge Learned Hand, held that, because the crux of the crime of 
conspiracy is an agreement to commit a crime and not the knowledge that a 
crime will eventually be committed, a conspirator is liable only for the 
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 114. Id. at 697. 
 115. A conspiracy is formed when two or more people agree together to commit a crime.  
In a conspiracy, the crime is complete when the two people agree and take a concrete step 
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 116. This section focuses primarily on conspiracy. 
 117. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).  For further discussion of Kotteakos, see infra Part III.B. 
 118. 100 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1938). 
 119. Id. at 401–02. 
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crimes of others to which he agreed.122  This ruling meant that a conspirator 
could not be held liable for the criminal conduct of coconspirators that was 
outside the “common purpose[]” of the conspiracy.123  Similarly, the court 
held that in order to be liable for abetting Regno, Peoni must have 
affirmatively joined in Regno’s own crime of passing counterfeit bills.124  
Calling the idea that Peoni had agreed with Regno that Dorsey should 
receive the bills “absurd,” the court reversed Peoni’s conviction.125 
The Peoni ruling imposed critical limiting factors on the scope of both 
conspiracy and aiding-and-abetting liability.  The latter has been cited by 
courts across the country in support of similar rulings126—even the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly treated Peoni as black letter law.127  Indeed, 
the limiting principles that motivated the Peoni ruling still guide decisions 
of the Second Circuit today.128 
The Second Circuit took the next step in restricting the scope of 
conspiracy liability two years later in its opinion in United States v. 
Falcone,129 where it addressed whether the seller of entirely licit goods that 
eventually were used in the course of a crime could be criminally charged.  
In Falcone, the defendant, a sugar distributor from Utica, was engaged in 
selling sugar to grocers, who then in turn sold the sugar to operators of 
illicit alcohol stills throughout New York.130  The facts made clear that 
Falcone was aware that the sugar was eventually sold to illegal distilleries 
but that Falcone did not himself sell the sugar to the distilleries.131  He was 
nevertheless convicted of a conspiracy to operate an illicit still.132 
The Second Circuit took the opportunity presented by Falcone’s appeal 
to further clarify the scope of conspiracy liability.  The court surveyed the 
varying jurisprudence on the matter from its sister courts of appeals and 
aligned itself with the view of the Fifth Circuit:  to be deemed a conspirator, 
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the seller of goods must “make [the illegal venture on] his own, [and] have 
a stake in its outcome.”133  In other words, the seller must not only know of 
the illegal purpose of the conspiracy but also must agree to be part of the 
illegality.  The court concluded that Falcone had not made any such 
agreement.  The Second Circuit thereby both pronounced a critical 
limitation on the crime of conspiracy and added to a growing circuit 
split.134 
Like Peoni, Falcone was written by Judge Learned Hand, who was an 
avid opponent of the expansion of federal conspiracy law that began as 
early as the 1920s.135  Years later, the Supreme Court would acknowledge 
the strength of Judge Hand’s voice in the “unavailing protest of courts 
against the growing habit to indict for conspiracy in lieu of prosecuting for 
the substantive offense itself,” citing this type of “loose practice” in 
conspiracy prosecutions as a “serious threat to fairness in our administration 
of justice.”136 
B.  The Law of Multiple Conspiracies 
Several years after its decision in Falcone, the Second Circuit had 
another opportunity to address the law of conspiracy in a case that would 
later give rise to one of the most important Supreme Court decisions in our 
national conspiracy jurisprudence.  In United States v. Lekacos,137 the 
defendants were convicted of a conspiracy to obtain fraudulent loans under 
the National Housing Act.  At trial, the evidence showed that Lekacos and 
his codefendants were guilty of conspiring with an individual named 
Brown.138  However, unbeknownst to Lekacos, Brown had also conspired 
with several other groups of individuals, and evidence as to those other 
conspiracies was admitted against Lekacos.139  On appeal, the Second 
Circuit reviewed its holdings in Falcone and Peoni and reiterated that mere 
knowledge of other criminal conduct by coconspirators is not enough to 
charge the original conspirator with the other conduct.140  In this case, 
Lekacos and his codefendants were similar to “[t]hieves who dispose of 
their loot to a single receiver,” who “do not by that fact alone become 
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 138. Id. at 172. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 172–73. 
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confederates:  they may, but it takes more than knowledge that he is a 
‘fence’ to make them such.”141  Accordingly, the court held that in a case of 
multiple, separate conspiracies linked by one individual—a so-called “hub 
and spoke” conspiracy—members of one separate conspiracy cannot be 
said to have conspired with members of another conspiracy simply by 
virtue of their link to the individual.142 
The Second Circuit’s view of the law of multiple conspiracies was 
enshrined by the Supreme Court in Kotteakos, which is one of the most 
frequently cited cases on conspiracy law today.  Echoing the underlying 
opinion in Lecakos, the Kotteakos Court held that the government’s proof 
“made out a case, not of a single conspiracy, but of several, notwithstanding 
only one was charged in the indictment.”143  Deeming the Lekacos Court’s 
analogy to thieves sharing the same fence an “apt” comparison, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s holding.144 
In United States v. McDermott,145 the Second Circuit continued to 
develop the law of multiple conspiracies by overturning the conviction of 
James McDermott on charges of conspiracy.  In a salacious story that 
delighted the news media, McDermott was charged with conspiring with 
two individuals—his girlfriend Kathryn Gannon, a “pornographic film star” 
and alleged prostitute,146 and another boyfriend of Gannon, Anthony 
Pomponio, of whose existence McDermott was not aware—to commit 
insider trading.147  According to the government, when McDermott would 
tell Gannon a piece of confidential information, Gannon would then convey 
the information to Pomponio, who would trade on the information.148  The 
government argued that the “unit[y of] purpose” between McDermott and 
Pomponio—i.e., to provide insider information and to have that information 
acted upon—tied the two men together in a conspiracy to achieve that 
purpose, despite the lack of an affirmative agreement (or, indeed, any 
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contact) between them.149  McDermott was convicted at trial on both the 
substantive and the conspiracy counts.150 
On appeal, McDermott quite naturally argued that, because he had not 
known that his girlfriend had another boyfriend, he could not possibly have 
conspired with the boyfriend to commit a crime.151  The court determined 
that sufficient evidence supported McDermott’s conviction of the 
substantive crime of insider trading with Gannon, but held as a matter of 
law that, because McDermott did not know of Pomponio’s existence (much 
less his involvement with Gannon), McDermott could not have entered into 
a single conspiracy that included both Gannon and Pomponio.152  The court 
rejected the government’s attempt to “redefine a conspiracy by its purpose, 
rather than by the agreement of its members to that purpose.”153  
“[D]eclin[ing] to hold . . . that a cheating heart must foresee a cheating 
heart,” the court reversed the conspiracy counts,154 and out of concern that 
the evidence regarding the conspiracy had tainted McDermott’s trial on the 
substantive insider trading counts, ordered a new trial for McDermott on the 
substantive counts as well.155 
C.  Specialized Forms of Conspiracy 
Notwithstanding its relatively frequent posture of restraining attempted 
expansions of the law of conspiracy, the Second Circuit also has been a 
leader in the development of more specialized forms of conspiracy—most 
prominently, tax-related conspiracies.  The Klein conspiracy, which 
originated from a 1957 case of the same name, United States v. Klein,156 is 
now a ubiquitous term within the federal courts for a conspiracy to prevent 
the government from investigating a possible tax crime.157  In Klein, the 
defendant and several others were charged with a massive conspiracy to 
import whiskey into the United States without paying the required import 
tax, thereby flouting the United States’s then-strict price controls on hard 
liquor.158  They allegedly carried out their scheme using at least three 
illegal means:  by creating shell companies in Canada and Cuba that would 
conduct the actual transactions, by filing falsified tax returns and concealing 
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income, and by lying to IRS investigators by submitting falsified 
interrogatories when the scheme was uncovered.159 
Although the district court dismissed the substantive tax evasion charges 
during the trial, the defendants were tried and convicted of conspiracy 
against the United States pursuant to the federal conspiracy statute,160 
which forbids conspiracies that “deprive [the government] of property 
rights through deceptive means.”161  On appeal, the Second Circuit upheld 
Klein’s conviction, holding for the first time that a conspiracy to interfere 
with or obstruct the government in its enforcement of the tax code 
constitutes a conspiracy affirmatively to deprive the United States of 
property rights.162  Since then, nearly every federal appellate court in the 
country has adjudicated an appeal from a Klein conspiracy conviction and 
has made special reference to the role of the Second Circuit in developing 
the doctrine.163 
Notwithstanding its controversial nature, the Klein conspiracy doctrine 
has never directly been tested in the Supreme Court, and recent decisions of 
the Second Circuit, most notably United States v. Coplan,164 have cast 
serious doubt on the continuing viability of the doctrine.  Time will tell 
whether this judge-made crime may constitutionally continue to be 
prosecuted. 
IV.  PUBLIC CORRUPTION 
Federal prosecutors long have sought to combat public corruption using 
federal laws against mail and wire fraud, obstruction of justice, and bribery, 
as well as two broader statutes known as the Hobbs Act165 and the Travel 
Act.166  Because New York’s federal prosecutors have been significant 
leaders in the anticorruption field, the Second Circuit has emerged as a 
strong voice in such cases as well. 
A.  The Abscam Cases 
One of the most prominent and controversial instances of a vast, far-
reaching sting operation, which implicated a number of the doctrines 
described above, was the “Abscam” group of prosecutions of the late 1970s 
and early 1980s.167  Abscam arose out of an extensive and meticulously 
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planned sting in which FBI agents worked with convicted fraudster Melvin 
Weinstein to generate a scheme geared toward uncovering corruption 
within the federal and state governments.  Posing as agents for a 
(nonexistent) Middle Eastern sheikh, Weinstein and FBI Agent Anthony 
Amoroso (under a pseudonym) met with numerous congressmen and other 
government officials to induce them to accept bribes or other illegal 
benefits in exchange for political favors.  Although some of the officials 
refused the bribes, most did not.  Those who accepted the bribes—the 
Abscam defendants—were arrested and charged with various offenses, 
including taking illegal gratuities and bribes, violations of the Travel Act, 
and conflicts of interest.  The Abscam prosecutions, although primarily 
located within the Second Circuit, spanned federal courts from New York 
City to Washington, D.C.168 
Over the course of a number of appeals,169 the Abscam defendants raised 
twin attacks against their convictions:  that they were “reluctant” victims of 
entrapment by the government and that the government had violated their 
due process rights by taking an “excessive” role in procuring the criminal 
conduct.  The court observed that the burden of disproving entrapment lay 
upon the government, requiring it to prove to the jury that “the defendants 
were predisposed . . . to commit offenses of the sort charged and ‘awaiting 
any propitious opportunity.’”170  The court extensively reviewed the 
evidence presented by the defendants to determine whether the defendants 
were reluctant participants or were predisposed to criminal activity.  The 
court found that in most, if not all cases, the defendants’ “reluctance” to 
participate in the scheme was “flat[ly] refute[d]” by the evidence.171  The 
court further found that, although the government certainly provided the 
opportunity for the defendants to commit illegal activities, including the 
“coaching” of some conspirators in their interaction with the undercover 
FBI agents by the government’s cooperator, sufficient evidence 
demonstrated the defendants’ predisposition toward official misconduct to 
justify a finding of guilt.172 
The court also examined the due process issue raised by many of the 
Abscam defendants to determine whether, among other things, the 
government had acted unconstitutionally by allegedly “creat[ing] the 
crimes” or using excessive inducements to elicit the defendants’ illegal 
conduct.173  Unlike in the entrapment analysis, which focused on the 
conduct of the defendants, the relevant issue in the due process analysis was 
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whether the government had overstepped its bounds to the point where the 
convictions were “unfair.”174  In the end, although the court expressed 
reservations about the government’s role in bringing about the illegal 
activities, the court determined that the undercover agents had done no 
more than create the opportunity for the defendants to act illegally and that 
the government had therefore acted within its rights (if only barely) in 
conducting the sting.175  Accordingly, and not without some sharp words of 
caution from the Second Circuit, the Abscam defendants’ convictions were 
affirmed. 
The Second Circuit’s treatment of the Abscam scandal drove a national 
conversation on the federal government’s investigatory tactics, resulting in 
congressional hearings and revised policies from the Attorney General’s 
Office.176  It also influenced the decision making of its sister courts of 
appeals:  although the Second Circuit was the first to address the due 
process issues raised by the Abscam defendants, the Third Circuit and the 
D.C. Circuit addressed other Abscam appeals and were similarly troubled 
by the apparent involvement of the government in creating or inducing the 
crimes.177  The Second Circuit’s Abscam opinions provided a key point of 
reference for the other courts as they sought to address the government’s 
conduct, and both courts invoked the Second Circuit’s decisions in 
reluctantly validating their courts’ Abscam prosecutions.178 
B.  Other Official Misconduct 
In addition to the issues of due process it addressed in the Abscam cases, 
the Second Circuit has made its mark on the substantive elements of public 
corruption statutes.  In United States v. Margiotta,179 the Second Circuit 
addressed the definition of extortion for the purposes of the Hobbs Act.  In 
that case, Joseph Margiotta, the chairman of the Republican Committee of 
Nassau County, negotiated a deal with a local insurance brokerage, the 
Williams Agency, in which Margiotta would appoint the Agency as the 
official insurance broker for the County’s properties in exchange for the 
Agency’s promise to allow Margiotta to award a portion of its municipal 
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insurance policies to others as political favors.180  The government alleged 
that his actions constituted a “wrongful use” of his office “under color of 
official right,”181 because Margiotta had used the power of his office to 
solicit benefits from individuals wishing to do business with his party (and, 
therefore, with the government).182  Margiotta was charged with and 
convicted of extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act.183 
On appeal, Margiotta argued that he had not caused or threatened any 
harm to those from whom he requested bribes and that his conduct “was a 
good faith continuation of a long-standing and widely known political 
patronage arrangement in New York.”184  He further argued that he was not 
a public official within the meaning of the Hobbs Act because he had no 
official government office, and therefore could not be guilty of extortion as 
a matter of law.185  In a lengthy and thorough opinion that delved into 
various “competing visions of political history” and that discussed how “the 
line between legitimate political patronage and fraud on the public has 
always been difficult to draw,”186 the Second Circuit determined that, 
although Margiotta was not formally a government official, he wielded 
power over such officials by virtue of his office and that he caused those 
officials (unknowingly) to “exercise their power in a manner which induced 
the Williams Agency to make the kickbacks.”187  The court further 
determined that Margiotta had implied to the Agency that, if it did not 
cooperate with his scheme, it would be “excluded” from the municipality’s 
insurance business.188  That conduct, the court held, was more than enough 
to override Margiotta’s argument that he had not threatened the Agency.189  
Over the strong dissent of Judge Ralph Winter, who argued that the court’s 
opinion impermissibly criminalized mere “political disingenuousness,”190 
the court affirmed the conviction. 
In United States v. O’Grady,191 the Second Circuit picked up where it 
had left off in the Margiotta opinion.  In 1981, Edward O’Grady, a 
superintendent of the Quality Control Section, Department of New Car 
Engineering of the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA), was 
charged with violating the Hobbs Act by making wrongful use of his office:  
namely, that he had extorted vendors by accepting from them over forty 
fully paid trips to resorts, tickets to games at Madison Square Garden, 
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invitations to golf outings, meals, and other benefits, totaling over 
$34,000.192  O’Grady’s case was different from a standard extortion case, 
however, because the evidence at trial did not demonstrate that O’Grady 
had ever asked for a benefit—rather, the record demonstrated that the gifts 
were freely given, that vendors maintained company policies to give such 
gifts to customers, and that similar gifts were given to other senior NYCTA 
officials without repercussion.193  Nevertheless, O’Grady was convicted of 
extortion.194 
O’Grady’s appeal required the Second Circuit to determine the issue of 
whether a public official’s acceptance of unsolicited benefits, albeit with the 
knowledge that he was being given the benefits because of his public office, 
constituted extortion within the meaning of the Hobbs Act or whether some 
degree of duress on the part of the official was required.  The Second 
Circuit held that no duress was required and that the acceptance of 
unsolicited benefits was not prohibited by the Hobbs Act.195  Rather, the 
court held, “[e]xtortion . . . is committed when a public official makes 
wrongful use of his office to obtain money not due him or his office”—in 
other words, “there must . . . be proof that the public official did something, 
under color of his public office, to cause the giving of benefits.”196 
The Second Circuit’s Margiotta opinion, and the O’Grady opinion that 
built upon it, created a circuit split that led to a decade of controversy—
some even within the Second Circuit itself.197  This controversy eventually 
attracted the attention of the Supreme Court.  Eight years after O’Grady 
was issued, the Second Circuit’s opinion was explicitly overruled in Evans 
v. United States,198 which held that acceptance of benefits under color of 
official right constituted extortion within the meaning of the Hobbs Act 
without regard to whether the official had requested or demanded the 
proffered benefit.199 
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The Second Circuit addressed another major public corruption statute, 
the Travel Act, in the 1988 case of United States v. Biaggi.200  Mario 
Biaggi, a ten-term congressman for the Bronx and Westchester, was 
convicted in 1987 on charges relating to his receipt of gifts from individuals 
seeking to influence federal and New York State politics.201  Specifically, 
Biaggi was charged with having accepted several vacations, including a 
$3,200 getaway at a Florida spa, from a longtime friend and political ally, 
Meade Esposito, a semiretired leader in the Democratic Party in 
Brooklyn.202  Both Biaggi and Esposito argued that the vacation was merely 
a gift from one friend to another and that Esposito had received no favors in 
return; however, the government argued that the vacation constituted a 
bribe, or at the least an illegal gratuity, that Esposito paid to induce Biaggi 
to use his official position to benefit Esposito’s client.203  Although Biaggi 
initially was prosecuted for committing fraud against the United States and 
soliciting bribes, he was acquitted of those charges.204  He was convicted, 
however, on charges related to receipt of illegal gratuities, obstruction of 
justice, and violation of the Travel Act.205 
Biaggi appealed his conviction and his sentence on the grounds that, 
among other things, his actions to help Esposito’s client were not “official 
acts” because they were not taken in the course of his official duties as a 
federal legislator.206  The Second Circuit rejected his arguments, observing 
that “the duties of senators and representatives routinely include interceding 
with various agencies on behalf of their constituents”207 and that the local 
public officials who had testified at trial had said it was not unusual for a 
federal public official to intercede for a constituent on city matters.208  
Accordingly, the Second Circuit held that a congressman’s “official acts” 
include those directed at local, not merely federal, officials.209 
Finally, no discussion of public corruption jurisprudence in the Second 
Circuit would be complete without a mention of the court’s own brush with 
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corruption.  In 1939, then-Chief Judge Martin Manton, who was once the 
youngest judge ever to be appointed to the Second Circuit, resigned from 
the bench after rumors surfaced that he had taken bribes from parties 
seeking to buy his vote.210  Evidence later showed that Manton had suffered 
severe financial reversals during the Great Depression and had resorted to 
seeking and accepting money from litigants to avoid financial ruin.211  
Manton was tried in the court in which he had once sat as a judge, by a 
fellow federal judge who was brought in from the District of Maryland for 
that purpose, and attained the ignominious distinction of becoming the first 
federal judge convicted of receiving bribes.212  He served seventeen months 
of a two-year prison term and died shortly thereafter at the age of sixty-
six.213 
V.  SENTENCING 
As the nation’s financial capital in good times and in bad, New York has 
played host to some of the most prominent white collar crimes—including 
the largest Ponzi scheme in history in the collapse of Bernie Madoff’s 
investment empire.214  For that reason, the Second Circuit’s sentencing 
jurisprudence is both well publicized and influential. 
A.  Federal Sentencing Guidelines Issues 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“the Guidelines”) are an elaborate 
system of sentencing measures by which a judge may calculate the number 
of “levels” that are attributable to an offender’s conduct, apply additional 
conduct-based categories to enhance or reduce the number of levels 
attributable to the underlying offense, and then use a table to calculate the 
range of months of incarceration attributable to the final Guidelines level.  
When the Guidelines were commissioned by Congress in the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984, they were mandatory; they remained so for over 
twenty years.  In United States v. Booker,215 the Supreme Court invalidated 
the statute requiring district judges to sentence defendants according to the 
Guidelines, although it did not forbid courts to use the Guidelines as an 
advisory source.216  Although as a result of Booker their importance may 
now have somewhat decreased, the Guidelines continue to this day to play 
an enormous role in federal sentencing, particularly with regard to white 
collar and drug crimes. 
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Perhaps the most important Guidelines-related sentencing opinion issued 
by the Second Circuit in the last decade is United States v. Crosby,217 the 
appeal of a convicted felon found in possession of a firearm and sentenced 
to a ten-year prison term imposed pursuant to the Guidelines.  In Crosby, 
the court had its first opportunity to address the Guidelines’ validity after 
the Supreme Court’s Booker decision.  The court overturned Crosby’s 
sentence on the ground that the district court had treated the Sentencing 
Guidelines as mandatory, writing that 
[i]n considering [the issue of the lawfulness of Crosby’s sentence], we are 
mindful that this will be the first sentencing appeal decided by our Court 
since the decision in Booker/Fanfan.  As such, it will likely be of special 
interest to the district judges of this Circuit as they confront a host of new 
issues.  It would be entirely inappropriate for us even to try to anticipate 
all of those issues, much less resolve them.  Nevertheless, we believe that 
in the aftermath of a momentous decision like Booker/Fanfan, which will 
affect a large number of cases confronting the district judges of this 
Circuit almost daily, it is appropriate for us to explain the larger 
framework within which we decide this appeal.  We do so in the hope that 
our explanation will be helpful to bench and bar alike.218 
The court’s hope was borne out:  although the Crosby decision did not 
resolve all, or even many, of the issues that arose from the Booker decision 
and its progeny, as a result of the court’s careful exposition of pre-Booker 
sentencing law, Crosby has become the seminal Second Circuit case 
applying the Booker decision to its own jurisprudence.  Although Crosby 
was later overruled in part by the Second Circuit in United States v. 
Cavera,219 the case nevertheless remains a key part of the structure of post-
Booker sentencing in the Second Circuit to this day. 
One Guidelines case with particular relevance to white collar criminal 
jurisprudence is United States v. Milikowsky.220  In Milikowsky, the 
defendant, the principal of several small steel-related businesses, was 
alleged to have conspired with others to fix the prices of new steel drums to 
be sold in the eastern part of the United States, including the New Haven, 
Connecticut area where he was arrested.221  After a three-week jury trial, 
Milikowsky was convicted of price fixing in violation of the Sherman 
Act.222  He argued at sentencing that the court should sentence him 
leniently because his imprisonment would have a “destructive effect” on his 
employees at the steel mills.223  The district judge determined that 
Milikowsky’s situation was one of the rare instances where “the loss of his 
 
 217. 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 218. Id. at 106–07. 
 219. 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 220. 65 F.3d 4 (2d Cir. 1995).  Milikowsky was decided when application of the 
Guidelines was still mandatory but continues to be used today. 
 221. Id. at 5–6. 
 222. Id. at 6; see 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 223. Milikowsky, 65 F.3d at 6. 
2016] WHITE COLLAR CRIME 65 
daily guidance would extraordinarily impact . . . persons who are employed 
by him.”224  As such, the court sentenced Milikowsky to probation.225 
On appeal, the Second Circuit had the opportunity to address an issue 
that has particular relevance to the unique concerns of white collar 
sentencing:  whether a sentencing court may consider the fact that the 
defendant is critical to the ongoing operation of a business and that his 
imprisonment would inflict undue hardship upon innocent employees.226  
The court answered this question in the affirmative.  Although the court 
acknowledged that generally the “business effects” of incarcerating a white 
collar offender should not be considered by sentencing judges, it observed 
that courts were certainly permitted to grant a downward departure in 
“appropriate circumstances”—including those where a departure was 
necessary to “reduce the destructive effects that incarceration of a defendant 
may have on innocent third parties.”227  Because the court determined that 
“extraordinary effects on an antitrust offender’s employees, ‘to a degree[] 
not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission,’ 
warrant a downward departure,” the court affirmed Milikowsky’s 
sentence.228 
B.  Modern Trends in White Collar Sentencing:  
Judicial Independence and Substantive Unreasonableness 
Long before the Supreme Court declared the Guidelines unconstitutional, 
Second Circuit judges and the lawyers who argue before them began to 
criticize the effect of the Guidelines on federal sentencing.229  Perhaps as a 
result of its members’ willingness to speak on their concerns regarding the 
Guidelines, the Second Circuit has played host to ever-growing controversy 
regarding the rapid inflation of white collar sentences.  Today, 
commentators (including federal judges) regularly raise questions as to 
whether the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, although nonbinding, 
nevertheless have such an effect upon sentencing judges that they result in 
substantively unreasonable sentences—in other words, sentences that so 
“shock the conscience” as to constitute a manifest injustice and thereby 
require reversal.230 
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Since the economic tumult that began after the “dot com” bubble burst, 
and as a result of the strict sentencing provisions instituted by Congress in 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002231 and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,232 sentences for financial crimes, in 
the Second Circuit and elsewhere, have increased significantly, and the 
subject of substantive unreasonableness has become more frequently 
discussed.233  Although the Second Circuit has repeatedly reaffirmed in 
recent times that a sentencing judge’s policy disagreement with the 
Guidelines is a valid basis for imposing a non-Guideline sentence,234 the 
court itself has been reluctant to overturn sentences on the ground of 
substantive unreasonableness.235  Nevertheless, as the post-financial crisis 
white collar sentencing regime continues to take shape, and judges’ post-
Booker understanding of the role of the Guidelines in determining federal 
sentences continues to develop and mature, the court will undoubtedly 
continue to be the key driver of discussion and jurisprudence in these areas 
that it has been in so many others. 
VI.  WHITE COLLAR PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
Because of its business expertise and relatively sizeable white collar 
criminal docket, the Second Circuit is a national leader in jurisprudence 
arising from white collar criminal cases.  Foremost in the Second Circuit’s 
groundbreaking jurisprudence are its decisions concerning the application 
of the attorney-client privilege in highly complex and sophisticated matters.  
Courts across the country have adopted some of the Second Circuit’s most 
critical rulings on privilege and other matters of white collar practice. 
A.  The Kovel Letter 
In United States v. Kovel,236 the Second Circuit established the “Kovel 
Doctrine,” which protects the confidentiality of communications between a 
lawyer, a client, and an accountant (or other professional) engaged by the 
lawyer to assist in the representation of the client.  Criminal defense 
practitioners now commonly speak of a “Kovel Letter”:  a letter agreement 
between an attorney and a professional service provider that ensures that the 
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appealed his sentence on multiple grounds, including, most relevantly, that the sentence was, 
as a result of the application of the Guidelines as enhanced by Sarbanes-Oxley, substantively 
unreasonable. Rigas, 583 F.3d at 115.  Each defendant was unsuccessful. Id. at 126. 
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service provider’s work will take place within the protection of the 
attorney-client privilege.237 
On September 6, 1961, Louis Kovel, an accountant who worked at a law 
firm and who had performed accounting work on behalf of a firm client, 
was subpoenaed to testify against the client in the grand jury.238  At the 
direction of his law firm employer, Kovel refused to testify, asserting that 
his work was protected by the attorney-client privilege.239  The judge 
overseeing the grand jury ordered Kovel to testify, and he continued to 
refuse.240  The judge therefore held Kovel in criminal contempt and 
sentenced him to one year of imprisonment.241  Kovel served four days in 
jail and appealed his conviction.242 
The Second Circuit, speaking through Judge Friendly, overturned the 
conviction.  Observing that it is undisputed that a translator’s work is 
protected by the attorney-client privilege, the court said, pithily, that 
“[a]ccounting concepts are a foreign language to some lawyers in almost all 
cases, and to almost all lawyers in some cases.”243  In the same vein, 
accountants’ work, and that of other professionals who similarly address 
issues that cannot easily be addressed by attorneys, must be given the 
benefit of the attorney-client privilege.  Indeed, the court noted, the 
complexity of modern white collar criminal cases means that attorneys 
often cannot address fully their clients’ concerns without the help of other 
professionals.244  The court, therefore, held that the privilege must extend to 
those professionals who are “indispensable” to an attorney’s ability to 
represent a client, so long as such professionals’ work is done for the 
purpose of providing legal advice to the client.245 
The Kovel decision has been cited by nearly every federal appellate court 
in the country and adopted in full or in part by many.246  It has been 
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extended to cases well outside its original application, including civil 
cases,247 and is commonly invoked when “the purpose of the third party’s 
participation is to improve the comprehension of the communications 
between attorney and client.”248  It is not too much to say that the Second 
Circuit’s Kovel decision changed the way modern attorneys practice law.  
Although the doctrine is not without its limitations, today, thanks to Kovel, 
attorneys nationwide may safely employ professionals of all types to 
generate and analyze integral parts of their cases, relying upon the attorney-
client privilege to protect their communications with those professionals. 
B.  The Act of Production Privilege 
The Second Circuit also has recognized an “act of production” privilege, 
which extends the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination to 
situations in which individuals have been directed to turn over documents 
the mere existence of which, or the individuals’ possession of which, would 
be incriminating.  Although the privilege was first developed by the 
Supreme Court,249 the Second Circuit adopted the doctrine wholeheartedly 
in United States v. Praetorius250 and In re Katz,251 both of which 
determined that the Fifth Amendment protects individuals from a required 
“testimonial” production of personal records. 
In 1979, the Second Circuit addressed the waiver of the privilege against 
self-incrimination in the context of organizational privilege.  In United 
States v. O’Henry’s Film Works, Inc.,252 the court held that a film 
company’s CEO, Henry Pergament, had not waived his Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination by responding to an IRS subpoena.  The 
subpoena, issued to Pergament in his capacity as president of the company, 
requested certain receipts and ledgers held by the company; Pergament 
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responded that neither he nor the film company possessed or controlled the 
subpoenaed records.253  The government thereafter took the position that, 
because Pergament had responded to that question in spite of his right to 
invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege, he had made a complete waiver his 
Fifth Amendment privilege.254  Pergament responded that he had not 
waived the privilege at all, and he refused to answer further questions.255 
As the Second Circuit observed on appeal, it is well established that the 
Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to 
corporations.256  Therefore, a corporate agent is under a duty to produce the 
organization’s records even when such records may be incriminating.257  
However, even a corporate agent retains his individual Fifth Amendment 
privilege, and it is not unreasonable that the production of corporate records 
would, as it did in this case, create criminal exposure for the corporate 
agent.258  Therefore, where a corporate agent is implicated in illegal activity 
by the company (or vice versa), reliance on the act of production privilege 
would inevitably bring the corporation’s responsibilities into tension with 
the agent’s rights.259  In balancing that tension, the court observed that it is 
clear that a corporate agent’s personal right against self-incrimination 
would be waived in a limited manner by his producing, or failing to 
produce, the subpoenaed corporate records; the question that the court 
therefore had to address was whether that waiver would be voluntary and, if 
so, whether the waiver extended beyond the scope of the relevant document 
production.260  The court determined that, because the corporate agent’s 
waiver was compelled by the corporation’s lack of Fifth Amendment 
privilege, it was not a voluntary waiver and that a corporate agent 
answering questions regarding documents in the corporation’s possession 
could not be forced to answer questions on any other matters touching on 
his individual criminal exposure unless he waived his personal Fifth 
Amendment right or was immunized.261  The court thereby provided 
corporate agents with as much protection as possible without abrogating the 
law denying Fifth Amendment rights to corporations. 
The Second Circuit further strengthened the act of production privilege 
four years later in United States v. Fox.262  In Fox, the defendant was the 
owner of a sole proprietorship that was subject to an audit by the IRS.263  
When the IRS sought the books and records of the proprietorship, Fox 
sought to invoke the act of production privilege.264  The district court held 
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that the act of production privilege protects only those documents that are 
“purely personal” and that the protection does not reach business records.265  
The court reviewed the records that Fox sought to protect and determined 
that those records were not “personal” and that, therefore, “producing the 
summoned documents [would] not constitute compelled testimonial 
communication under the fifth amendment.”266  The court ordered the 
documents produced to the government but stayed its order in order to 
permit Fox to appeal.267 
Upon reviewing the case, the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s 
order.  The court reviewed the history of the act of production privilege and 
acknowledged that corporations generally do not have a right against self-
incrimination.268  However, the court noted, Fox’s corporation was a sole 
proprietorship and thus “st[ood] on different constitutional grounds.”269  
Unlike a corporation, any liability to which the company was exposed 
would invariably put the owner of a sole proprietorship in the same exposed 
position—and indeed, in this case, the court observed that it appeared “the 
government [was] attempting to compensate for its lack of knowledge by 
requiring Fox to become the primary informant against himself.”270  The 
court accordingly held that “[b]ecause a sole proprietorship has no legal 
existence apart from its owner, the compelled disclosure of a sole 
proprietor’s private or business papers implicates his privilege against self-
incrimination.”271 
As a final note on the scope of the act of production privilege, it is 
important to realize that, although the main thrust of its jurisprudence was 
toward greater coverage by the Fifth Amendment privilege, the Second 
Circuit also has carefully preserved a long-recognized exception to the 
privilege by which “required records”—those records created in compliance 
with a statutory requirement, such as the Bank Secrecy Act—are not 
immune from production.272  Although the required records exception has 
been called into question by other courts of appeals, the Second Circuit 
reaffirmed the exception as recently as three years ago in In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena Dated February 2, 2012.273 
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CONCLUSION 
The Second Circuit’s contribution to the development of white collar 
jurisprudence over the past century and a half is immense and broad.  The 
court has issued watershed opinions in nearly every area of white collar 
law, practice, and procedure.  It has guided the national conversation on the 
nature of white collar criminality and the appropriate punishment for 
financial crimes.  It has created and resolved circuit splits, and its decisions 
have inspired the Supreme Court to speak on issues that have shaped white 
collar law and deeply divided the courts of appeals.  The Second Circuit’s 
role as the nation’s compass, and perhaps its conscience, in white collar 
criminal matters promises to continue and to grow even greater over the 
next century and beyond. 
